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I.

Introduction

When the New York State Office of the Inspector General (“NYOIG”) suspected that a New York State employee named Michael
Cunningham was submitting false time reports, its investigators turned to
electronic surveillance to assist in their collection of evidence.3 Without
obtaining a judicial warrant, NY-OIG investigators covertly attached a
global positioning system (GPS) device to Cunningham’s car and
collected data on Cunningham’s vehicular movements twenty-four hours a
day for a month, including during his vacation.4 Ultimately, the GPS data
was used in a disciplinary hearing leading to Cunningham’s termination.5
After litigation below, the New York State Court of Appeals in
Cunningham v. New York State Dept. of Labor ruled on the
constitutionality of NY-OIG’s warrantless collection of data in this case.
In a nutshell, the Court of Appeals ruled that the search in the
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Cunningham case fell under the workplace exception to the warrant
requirement, but that the search was unreasonable in its scope, requiring
suppression of the obtained evidence.
Cunningham thus provides some limited guidance to investigative
agencies considering the utilization of GPS devices, namely: (1) a search
warrant is likely unnecessary when using electronic surveillance to
investigate government employees in workplace-related matters; and (2) a
reasonable search must involve constraints on the data collection.6
Cunningham does not explain the parameters of those constraints,
however, nor does it tackle the logistical and technical difficulties in
limiting data collection from GPS devices.
This article examines the Cunningham case and discusses its
implications for practitioners. It also provides suggestions for managing
some of the uncertainties caused by the still-unsettled state of the law in
this area, even after Cunningham, and surveys possible developments that
will impact this issue in the upcoming years.
II.

Historical Background

A. Search and Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides that:
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.7
Initially, courts limited Fourth Amendment analysis to common-law
trespass intrusions.8 Over time, courts expanded the scope of the Fourth
Amendment beyond merely trespasses into brick-and-mortar physical
spaces like residences. In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court
explicitly recognized that individuals may have reasonable expectations of
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U.S. CONST. amend. IV. New York State’s equivalent is found in N.Y. Const. art. I,
section 12:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The right of the
people to be secure against unreasonable interception of telephone and
telegraph communications shall not be violated, and ex parte orders or
warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that there is
reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus
obtained, and identifying the particular means of communication, and
particularly describing the person or persons whose communications
are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof.
8
See Lauren Elena Smith, Jonesing for a Test: Fourth Amendment Privacy in the Wake
of United States v. Jones, 58 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1003, 1007 (2013) (citing Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (discussing the Supreme Court using a physical
invasion test, also referred to as the trespass test, to decide early search cases)). The
Court held that an action must involve a physical imposition on material entities
belonging to a person to constitute a Fourth Amendment search, noting that “the wellknown historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment ... was to prevent the use of
governmental force to search a man's house, his person, his papers, and his effects, and to
prevent their seizure against his will.” Id. (quoting United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347,
353 (1967)).

3

privacy in arenas beyond just their homes.9 Moreover, the Katz Court
determined that although property law played a significant role in
determining the reasonableness of a warrantless search of premises,
widely-shared social expectations were also relevant.10 The formulation of
this view became the standard that we now know as the “reasonable
expectation of privacy,” requiring: “first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”11
This shift in the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment provided
courts with a framework for analyzing electronic searches and ultimately
electronic surveillance.12 In 2009, the New York State Court of Appeals in
People v. Weaver applied the Katz reasonable expectation standard in
deciding whether the use of a GPS device to track an individual’s
9
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movements constituted a Fourth Amendment search.13 In suppressing
evidence derived from a GPS device affixed to a private vehicle for 65
days without a warrant, the Weaver court reasoned that the GPS readings
were not a mere enhancement of human sensory capacity, and that the
defendant retained a privacy expectation while in his vehicle.14 While
declining to decide the issue as a matter of federal law, the Court of
Appeals concluded that as a matter of New York state law, the use of the
GPS device in Weaver’s case constituted a search that was
unconstitutional absent a warrant.15
The United States Supreme Court similarly found in 2013 in
United States v. Jones that the installation and use of a GPS device
constituted a Fourth Amendment search, though it took a different route to
that conclusion.16 The Jones Court explained that the common law
trespass test was not displaced by the “reasonable expectations” test, and
that either theory could support a determination that an investigatory
action constituted a search.17 In the particular circumstances of the Jones
case, the Court suppressed evidence from a GPS device that had been
13
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affixed to the defendant’s vehicle, reasoning that investigators physically
occupied the defendant’s private property for the purpose of obtaining
information. Because this was a physical intrusion that would have been
considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when
it was adopted, the Jones Court ruled it a search that – being warrantless
and not within any exception to the warrant requirement – mandated
suppression.18
B. The Workplace Exception to the Warrant Requirement
At the same time that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence defining
what constituted a “search” was evolving, well defined exceptions to the
warrant requirement also emerged, including the “workplace” exception.19
In 1987, the Supreme Court in a plurality opinion in O’Connor v. Ortega
carved out an exception to the warrant requirement for searches targeting
public employees, reasoning that it would be unduly burdensome to obtain
a warrant whenever an employer wished to enter an employee’s office,
desk or filing cabinets for a work-related purpose.20 The plurality opinion
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privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes,
as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the
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also noted that failing to carve out a warrant exception would impose
unwieldy procedural burdens on supervisors unfamiliar with the relevant
standards, and emphasized the strong governmental interest in an efficient
workplace.21 The exception applied notwithstanding the fact that some
personal items such as personal photographs or letters might be part of a
search.22 To fall under the workplace exception to the warrant
requirement, however, the following requirements must be met: (1) the
workplace search must be based on a reasonable suspicion of employee
misconduct that was justified at its inception; and (2) the workplace search
must be reasonable in its scope.23
In 1988, the New York State Court of Appeals in Caruso v. Ward
followed the O’Connor standard for determining the constitutionality of
workplace searches conducted by public employers.24 As had the

standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances.” Id. (citing O’Connor, 480 U.S.
at 725-26).
21
See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 720.
22
Id. at 722. The O’Connor plurality reasoned that certain areas of the workplace such as
the “hallways, cafeteria, offices, desks, and file cabinets, among other areas, are all part
of the workplace” and did not become personal areas through the actions of an employee.
Id.
23
See O’Connor, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), New Jersey
v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
24
See Caruso v. Ward, 72 N.Y.2d 432, 435 (1988). In Caruso, the police commissioner
issued an order establishing random drug testing for a particular unit of the police force
that served primarily in narcotics-related operations. Id. Respondent police association
sued and obtained an injunction against enforcement of the order on constitutional
grounds. Id. The police commissioner appealed and the court reversed, stating that
individualized reasonable suspicion was not required for the group of police officers. Id.
The court noted that the unit was voluntary and that members had already been subjected
to three drug tests as a condition of joining the unit. Id. at 436. The police officers had a
reduced expectation of privacy, and the department had established a justifiable interest
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O’Connor Court, the Court of Appeals in Caruso applied the exception to
all workplace searches for non-investigatory, work-related purposes as
well as for investigations of work-related misconduct.25
III.

Cunningham v. New York State Department of Labor

In 2008, the New York State Department of Labor (“DOL”)
initiated an investigation of Cunningham, a DOL employee, after
management received allegations that Cunningham had taken
unauthorized absences from duty and falsified records to conceal those
absences.26 That investigation resulted in a disciplinary proceeding, after
which Cunningham was suspended for two months.27 It also led to a
second investigation after Cunningham eluded an investigator who was
following Cunningham’s personal vehicle.28 The Department of Labor
referred the case to the NY-OIG, which attached a GPS device to
Cunningham’s personal vehicle while the car was parked in a parking lot
near DOL.29 The device, along with two later replacement devices,

and responsibility in random testing because the officers were exposed daily to drug
users and traffickers and to offers of drugs and money. Id.
25
Id. at 437 (citing O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 729).
26
See Cunningham, 21 N.Y.3d at 518.
27
See id.
28
See id. at 518-19.
29
See id. at 519.
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recorded Cunningham’s vehicular movements for a month, including
nights, weekends and during a Massachusetts vacation.30
Based on the NY-OIG’s investigation and report, DOL brought
new charges against Cunningham, eleven of which were sustained by a
hearing officer.31 Of the eleven sustained charges, four were based
exclusively on evidence obtained by the GPS device. 32 Four other charges
were supported by evidence that included the GPS information among
other things, and three charges did not utilize any of the GPS evidence.33
Following his hearing, Cunningham’s employment was
terminated. Cunningham filed a petition to challenge the ruling; the
petition was dismissed by the Appellate Division.34 Cunningham then
appealed to the New York State Court of Appeals, arguing that the GPS
evidence should have been suppressed because the GPS search did not fall
within the workplace exception and, in the alternative, was excessively
intrusive.35
The Court of Appeals decided the case in two parts: first, the court
considered whether the search fell within the workplace exception; and

30

See id. Other investigative methods utilized by NY-OIG later in the investigation
included physical surveillance, the obtaining of E-ZPass records, and interviews of
Cunningham and his secretary. Id.
31
See id.
32
See id.
33
See id.
34
See id.
35
See id. at 517, 521.
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second, it determined whether the requirements of that exception were met
in this case. With respect to whether a GPS search was permissible in the
absence of a search warrant, the Cunningham court first noted that,
consistent with its decision in Weaver, and the Supreme Court’s ruling in
United States v. Jones, the attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle for the
purpose of gathering information fell under the purview of the Fourth
Amendment and N.Y. Const. art. I, section 12.36 In other words, as had
been determined previously in other cases, the attachment and use of the
GPS device against Cunningham constituted a “search.”37 Cunningham,
however, given the defendant’s public employment, presented an issue of
first impression in New York: namely, whether a GPS search fell within
the workplace search warrant exception.38
Cunningham argued that the workplace exception should be
narrowly confined to the workplace itself or should relate only to
workplace-issued property that could be seen as an extension of the
workplace.39 Cunningham therefore reasoned that a warrant was required
in his case because the GPS device at issue was placed on his personal
vehicle.40 In rejecting Cunningham’s argument, the Court of Appeals
followed the reasoning from O’Connor that items such as a personal
36

See Cunningham, 21 N.Y.3d at 518.
Id. at 520.
38
See id. (citing Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d at 443, Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954).
39
See id. at 520.
40
See id.
37
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photograph on an employee’s desk, or a personal letter posted on an
employee’s bulletin board were deemed to be within the workplace
context.41 A personal car, the Court of Appeals reasoned, was in important
ways like a personal letter or personal photograph.42 The Cunningham
court also endorsed the O’Connor plurality’s reasoning that a warrant
requirement for public employers would impose a burden on supervisors
who were not well-versed in investigating criminal laws.43 Thus, the Court
of Appeals concluded that the NY-OIG did not violate the State or Federal
Constitutions by failing to seek a warrant before attaching a GPS device to
Cunningham’s private vehicle.44
The Cunningham court next turned to the two-pronged O’Connor
test to determine the reasonableness of the warrantless use of the GPS
device in Cunningham’s case.45 As to the first prong, a workplace
searched based on reasonable suspicion of employee misconduct must be
“justified at its inception.”46 Justice Smith determined that the NY-OIG
had satisfied this requirement, as DOL suspected Cunningham of

41

See id. (citing O’Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1508).
See id. at 520. Specifically, the Cunningham court noted that Cunningham was
required to report his arrival and departure times to his employer, which diminished the
expectation of privacy he had over the movements of his personal vehicle. Id.
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submitting false time records.47 The Cunningham court then turned to the
second prong: whether the search was reasonable in its scope.48 In finding
that the search was “excessively intrusive,” the Court of Appeals listed all
of the activity that the NY-OIG was able to track that had no relation to its
investigation.49 For example, using the GPS device the NY-OIG was able
to track Cunningham’s whereabouts on nights, weekends and even while
he was on vacation, none of which had anything to do with whether
Cunningham was actually working when he was supposed to be doing
so.50 The Cunningham court admitted that it might be “unreasonably
difficult” to eliminate all surveillance of an employee’s private activity,
but asserted that the NY-OIG could have taken steps to minimize its
tracking activity so that Cunningham would not have been tracked twentyfour hours a day, seven days a week, for a full month.51 Specifically, the
Court of Appeals noted that investigators on three separate occasions were
able to access the GPS device on the vehicle during the month of
surveillance, so it did not seem unreasonably difficult for investigators to
have engaged in some sort of minimization, presumably by removing the

47

See id.
See id.
49
See id. (citing O’Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1508).
50
See id.
51
See id. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that it might even be “impossible” to limit
a GPS search of an employee’s car so as to avoid capturing purely private activity. Id. at
522.
48
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device during times when it was unlikely to capture evidence of improper
conduct.52
In discussing the remedy for NY-OIG’s unreasonable search, the
Cunningham court determined that although no evidence of
Cunningham’s movements on nights, weekends or vacation was used
against him, the “extraordinary capacity” of the GPS device rendered all
evidence – including evidence obtained during work hours –
inadmissible.53 Thus, when an employer conducts an unreasonable search
using a GPS device “without making a reasonable effort to avoid tracking
an employee outside of business hours,” the search as a whole will be
deemed unreasonable.54 While the court did not specify what amount of
minimization would suffice as a constitutional matter, it suggested that
“surely it would have been possible to stop short of seven-day, 24-hour
surveillance for a full month.”55

52

See id. at 523. Investigators had removed the device twice to replace it with a new
device, and a third time when the surveillance period ended. Id.
53
See id. In describing the “extraordinary capacity” of the GPS device, the Court of
Appeals described the GPS’s ability to relentlessly track “anything.” Id. (quoting
Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d at 441).
54
See id.
55
Id. at 522-23.
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Four of the counts against Cunningham that relied exclusively on
the GPS device were dismissed, and the matter was remanded to the
Commissioner for Labor for redetermination of the penalty.56
IV.

What Cunningham Means for Practitioners

The Court of Appeals’ decision in Cunningham has implications
for Fourth Amendment law and practitioners. On the one hand, the
decision established that government investigators may track employees
through the use of a GPS device without first obtaining a judicially
authorized warrant, so long as the investigation meets the standards of the
workplace exception to the warrant requirement.57 On the other hand, the
Cunningham decision did not provide clarity on what sort of minimization
would suffice to ensure that the GPS search would meet the workplace
exception’s second prong of being reasonable in scope.58
Specifically, the Court of Appeals declined to provide a bright-line
rule that would guide government employers in conducting GPS
investigations.59 The only guidance the Cunningham court provided in this
area was a statement that in its investigation of whether Cunningham was
claiming that he worked when he did not, the NY-OIG should have

56

Id. at 523. While four counts relied solely on the GPS device, the remaining seven
counts either did not stem from the use of the GPS device at all or the GPS evidence was
duplicative of other evidence supporting the charge. Id.
57
See Cunningham, 21 N.Y.3d at 515.
58
See id. at 520-21.
59
See id. at 522-23.
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stopped short of seven-day, 24-hour surveillance for a month.60 The
suggestion from the court’s language is that it would be ideal in an
investigation of this sort for a GPS device to be affixed every morning and
removed when the workday ends. This, however, as any investigator who
has worked with an attachable GPS device knows, is logistically
unworkable. It is difficult enough to find an opportunity to covertly place
a device on an employee’s car in the first place and to replace the unit
when it malfunctions or its batteries expire; having to affix and remove it
on a daily basis would require significant “tech team” resources and
would almost certainly lead to the subject’s discovery of the surveillance.
Nevertheless, when dealing with the type of GPS device that must be
attached to a car, the most conservative approach given the current state of
the law would be to attach it only for those time periods that are relevant
to the investigation (or, of course, to obtain a warrant to cover the
surveillance).61

60

Id. The court also asked rhetorically: “Why could [NY-OIG] not also have removed
the device when, for example, petitioner was about to start his annual vacation?” Id. at
523.
61
A more generous (to law enforcement) reading of Cunningham suggests that a court
might accept as effective minimization the removal of the device when an employee is
away on vacation, at least to the extent that the impending vacation is known to the
investigators in advance. See id. It is not at all clear, however, that this level of
minimization would satisfy New York courts given the language in Cunningham that
appeared to disapprove of the GPS’s collection of data after work hours and on weekends
as well. See id. at 522-23. In any case, there are potential logistical problems with
minimizing this way. For example, investigators may not know of a vacation in advance.
Another wrinkle emerges with respect to certain government employees like emergency
responders, who must be available at all times for work.
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Nor did the Cunningham court consider whether a different kind of
minimization, other than physically removing the GPS device, would meet
the reasonable scope test – namely, electronic minimization whereby
either the device would be set to transmit data only during times relevant
to the investigation, or data would be transmitted at all times but only
relevant data would be retrieved and/or reviewed by the investigatory
team. Thus, it is at least possible that if this type of remote minimization
is or becomes technically feasible with the kind of device that is
physically affixed to a vehicle, courts might find that it satisfies the
workplace exception test.62
Counting on this would be a gamble, given the ruling in Jones.
There, the Supreme Court made clear that a trespass combined with the
gathering of information constitutes a search.63 When considering, then,
whether a search was reasonable in scope as part of the workplace
exception, it may be that the search as defined in Jones (a device affixed
to a car that is collecting information) cannot be reasonable when it
continues into periods not relevant to the investigation. Accordingly, it

62

Currently it appears that while it might be possible to set a commercial GPS device to
transmit only a limited amount of information, such as when a vehicle leaves a
designated area (a so-called “geofence,” see, e.g.,
www.motosafety.com/index_gs_plug.html, (last visited 07/31/14)), most of the devices
on the market now collect all of the locational information from the vehicle whether or
not the customer programs the device to transmit it to him/her for review. This scenario
would likely constitute a search under Jones, see infra & note.62.
63
132 S.Ct. 945, 950-51 (2012).
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would be quite risky to utilize a GPS device that investigators attached to
a car that collects information at all times, including times not relevant to
the investigation, even if that information did not ultimately make its way
to the investigators.64
One seemingly would be on firmer ground in a situation where
investigators placed a device that could be programmed not to collect
information during irrelevant periods, although the devices currently on
the market do not appear to have this capacity.65 In that case, the search as
defined by Jones arguably would end at the end of the workday when the
information gathering stopped, and would resume the next workday
morning when information gathering started again. While this scenario
has not been tested in the courts and does not appear to be currently
supported by the available technology, if the technology becomes
available it would seem that this type of search would satisfy both Jones
and Cunningham.

64

Even where data collected by the device during irrelevant periods was not transmitted
to the investigators by the device, or where some sort of a wall team was utilized to
shield the investigative team from the irrelevant information, the search would still be
going on during irrelevant time periods because of the intrusion of the device coupled
with the collection of data, rendering the search unreasonable in its scope according to
Jones.
65
See supra note 60.
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Notwithstanding Cunningham’s uncertainties, however, there is
some good news ahead for the use of GPS on private vehicles66 in
workplace investigations. As indicated above, Cunningham dealt solely
with the type of GPS device that must be physically installed by
investigators on a subject’s car. But GPS devices that are built-in, i.e.,
installed by the factory before purchase, are increasingly common. Indeed,
“telematics” systems, which provide geo-location data to third-party
providers, are standard on nearly 75% of cars now sold in the United
States.67
In those situations, where investigators obtain location
information through a third party without physically intruding upon an
employee’s car, Jones’s trespass theory of searches would not apply,68 and
the intrusion would be analyzed entirely under the reasonable expectation
of privacy theory of Katz69and its progeny. With appropriate
minimization to coincide with the scope of the investigation, it is likely
that this investigatory method will pass constitutional muster, both
66

Of course, government employees cannot assert privacy rights with respect to
government-owned vehicles they use as part of their jobs. See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at
717. There are many systems that track government vehicular fleets that can be readily
utilized by public agencies, see, e.g. www.networkfleet.com, (last visited 07/31/14).
67
Six manufacturers supply approximately 75% of cars sold in this country, see In-Car
Location Based Services: Companies are Taking Steps to Protect Privacy, but Some
Risks May Not Be Clear to Consumers, Gov’t Accountability Office, Dec. 2013, pp. 2-3,
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659509.pdf, and a review of those
manufacturers’ websites indicates that GPS technology is standard on all but the lowest
level models.
68
See 132 S.Ct. at 954.
69
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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because having consented to the data collection, the employee has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his vehicular movements, and
because even if deemed a “search,” the workplace exception should apply.
V.

Conclusions

Cunningham provides some limited guidance to investigators
using GPS devices to track the private cars of government employees. We
now know that the workplace exception to the warrant requirement applies
to such searches, although the lack of clarity in the Cunningham opinion
concerning minimization makes the holding of limited utility to
practitioners. Technology will ultimately make this problem a less
meaningful one, as more and more cars have built-in GPS systems that
can be accessed for law enforcement purposes without the need for
physically affixing a GPS device. In the meantime, the conservative
practice in an investigation of a government employee would be for the
investigators to obtain a warrant to physically place a GPS device on an
employee’s private car. Otherwise, given the language of Cunningham
and Jones, it is unlikely that investigators will be able to satisfy the
minimization requirements of the workplace exception for a physically
affixed device such as the one used in the Cunningham case. If obtaining
a warrant is undesirable for some reason and the GPS data is designed to
be merely supplementary to other evidence, investigators could try to
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minimize electronically as described above, although with the technology
currently in place there is a not insignificant risk that this would be
deemed insufficient to support the workplace exception in a court
challenge.
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